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Abstract
To address security concerns, a major change was introduced to the OCaml language and compiler
which made strings immutable and introduced array of bytes as replacement for mutable strings.
The change is progressively being pushed so that ultimately strings will be immutable. We have
investigated the way OCaml package developers undertook the change. In this paper we report
on a preliminary observation of software code from the main OCaml package management system.
For this purpose we instrumented versions of the OCaml compiler to get precise information into
the uptake of safe strings.
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1 Introduction
Following the LaFoSec study [6], a major change was introduced to the OCaml language
and compiler which splits the string data type into its now immutable version and a new
bytes data type representing arrays of bytes. The change is gradual and was initially made
in version 4.02.0 (see Table 1). The new immutable strings were available in the language
and standard library as well as the new array of bytes but the compiler would initially still
allow to mutate strings, issuing a warning to the developer. Immutable strings are now
default unless a specific option is set. In future versions of the compiler strings will only be
immutable.
The security rationale for the change was that any part of a code could alter a string value
it has access to regardless of encapsulation (e.g. string literals of the standard library could
be modified). The importance of the change and the fact the change is being carried out
gradually to retain backward compatibility during a period of time makes it an interesting
case to evaluate how developers perceive such changes and how they implement it within
their own development. As a starting point, we want to mechanically inspect the uptake
within developers’ codes. We have therefor developed versions of the compiler that observe
the uses of string, bytes, their associated operations, and the relevant compiler options. We
then run our observation compilers on openly accessible OCaml code. We chose to mine the
OCaml code that are provided through OCaml’s main package management system OPAM.
In this paper, we present the experiment setting and discuss our findings.
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Table 1 OCaml versions significant for string immutability.
OCaml version OPAM version Number of packages
Mutable strings 4.01.0 (2013-09) 1.1.2 (2014-06) 1382
Introduction of safe strings 4.02.0 (2014-08)
Last version of the 4.02 family 4.02.3 (2015-08) 1.2.1 (2015-03) 1699
Safe string as default 4.06.0 (2017-11)
Latest version 4.07.0 (2018-07) 1.2.2 (2015-04) 1921
Plan
In Section 2 we give more details about immutability, OCaml and LaFoSec which form the
context of this research. We present our experimental setting in Section 3 and the outcome
of our observations in Section 4. We finally conclude and discuss perspectives for this work
in Section 5.
2 Context
In this section we give the context to this research where we planned an observation of the
uptake of a security-induced change in the OCaml language.
2.1 Immutability
Mutability is a key feature of most programming language as it is a way for programmer to
represent the change of state of the system they develop. Some programming languages such
as functional languages prevent variable mutation, the state of the system is represented
by the arguments passed from operations to operations following the execution flows of the
program. An advantage of immutability is that it enables referential transparency which
means that a variable will always represent the same value within its scope: passing the
variable as argument to other operations or concurrent operations cannot modify its value. As
a result immutability is more secure as it brings certainty to the programmer. Mutability is a
source of vulnerability as the following CWEs (Common Weakness Enumeration) exemplify:
CWE-374: Passing Mutable Objects to an Untrusted Method1, CWE-471: Modification of
Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)2. Immutability is increasingly available in programming
languages although immutability could cause usability challenges for developers used to
state-base programming paradigms [11, 3].
2.2 OCaml
OCaml3 is a functional language. While being a functional language, it offers some mutable
data structures and variable references. In OCaml, strings are mutable since the early
versions of the language. This design choice seems to have been made to allow for easy use
of strings as byte arrays where mutability is essential.
1 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/374.html
2 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
3 https://ocaml.org/
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OCaml is also a strongly typed programming which means that each expression is
associated to a unique type. Its inference system implemented with its type system in
the compiler, makes it unnecessary in most cases to annotate the source code with type
information.
2.3 LaFoSec study
The LaFoSec study [6] analysed the intrinsic security properties of functional languages and
OCaml in particular. It was preceded by a study on Java Security [5]. LaFoSec detailed the
features such as encapsulation which are essential for security development, and identified
ways in which they could be bypassed. It highlighted the security issue of immutable strings.
Let us consider the following example of a function returning the days of the week as strings
(using OCaml 4.01.0 version).
# let weekday n =
match n with
| 1 -> "Monday"
| ...
val weekday : int -> string = <fun >
# weekday 1
- : string = "Monday"
The string literal of the function could be changed by any piece of code executed outside of
the current module, e.g. by any code dynamically loaded.
# let s = weekday 1; s.[0] <- ’F’; s.[1] <- ’r’; s.[2] <- ’i’;
# weekday 1
- : string = "Friday"
To prevent such tempering, LaFoSec recommended to protect string literals by wrapping
them in a call to the String.copy function, which means that each call to weekday will issue
a new copy of the string literal. In addition, LaFoSec recommended to define an abstract
module wrapping strings and which only offers access operations that do not mutate strings.
These solutions were implemented in the secure XML validator prototype developed as part
of LaFoSec and presented in [4]. The issue the mutable strings could cause to the reliability
of higher level formal development is discussed in [1], highlighting that one can temper with
the output of a logical frameworks. And [2] is another example of a formal development
which required to rely on a custom string library for the system to retain security guarantees.
2.4 Change
The change introduced by the OCaml development team makes the values of the type string
immutable by default and introduce a new type bytes for byte arrays (distinguishing the
two common uses of strings). The change could imply additional operations and therefor a
performance cost when needing to use string operations on bytes values as discussed in [10].
The change means that the methods of the String module (of the standard library) which
were modifying strings in-place are now deprecated. When used, they raise a warning or
an error if the -safe-string option of the compiler is used. Here is an example of warning
issued by the 4.07.0 compiler when calling String.set.
# String.set;;
Warning 3: deprecated: Stdlib.String.set
Use Bytes.set instead.
- : bytes -> int -> char -> unit = <fun >
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Note that the String.set function, which remained for backward compatibility, is an now
alias to Bytes.set and expect as first argument a value of type bytes unless in unsafe mode.
Calling String.set with a value of type string raises by default a type error with OCaml
4.07.0 version (OCaml 4.02.3 version would allow it by default).
# String.set "Monday";;
Warning 3: deprecated: Stdlib.String.set
Use Bytes.set instead.
Error: This expression has type string but an expression was expected
of type bytes
The functions that are now deprecated following the change are String.set (which corresponds
to the s.[0] <- ’F’ syntax sugaring notation), String.create, String.copy, String.fill.
Note that unsafe_* variants of String methods existed and are still available. E.g.,
String.unsafe_get allows to access a character of a string by its index as String.get does,
but does it without runtime verification that the access is done within the boundaries of the
string (this is used for optimisation purposes).
3 Experimental Setup
Instrumented compilers
To observe the manner OCaml users have adopted the new immutable strings and its
mutable counterpart, we created variants of the OCaml compiler that records specific usage
information. These instrumented compilers record the compiling options, the occurrence
of expressions of type string and bytes, and the occurrence of calls to string and bytes
methods4.
Working within the compiler means that we have certainty about the information we
gather: type information has been inferred and checked by the compiler. An alternative
would have been to work at the source level where similar content could have different forms
(e.g. qualified forms vs. unqualified forms), where some information are not available (e.g.
type information, command line options), and noise needs to be filtered out (e.g. commented
code).
We developed three instrumented compilers (or observer compilers) for the OCaml
versions we listed in Table 1. We refer to the compiler for OCaml 4.01.0 version as 4.01.0
(resp. 4.02.3, 4.07.0) and to our instrumented compiler as 4.01.0+obs (resp. 4.02.3+obs,
4.07.0+obs). Note that the three versions of OCaml are not retrocompatible and therefore
require dedicated compilers.
OCaml being a compiled and strongly typed language, a compilation is necessary to
execute OCaml programs and the compilation process includes typing the program after
parsing and before code generation. The instrumentation we created are placed at the end of
the typing when a typed Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the program is available.
Note that our current instrumented compilers look for string/bytes expressions and
string/bytes methods without investing further the context of use or within the program
flows. We are considering making such finer grained investigation in later research.
4 Note that some of the information we collected could be obtained with the -annot option but would
have required additional processing.
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Code repository
We also decided to work within OCaml’s OPAM package management system5 as source
codes in such system come alongside compiling instructions. This means that we were able
to automate the process of gathering information about individual packages and files. While
using OPAM means that we could easily access compilation commands, it also implies that
the targeted audience are package developers who are more likely to be professionals or
experts rather than general users of OCaml.
OPAM makes it trivial to deploy such custom compiler and retaining the dependency of
packages of the original version.
Related work on code mining
A number of related works have been mining openly available code [9], or have investigated
version histories to observe change [12, 8], sometimes working on the AST rather than source
code [7].
4 Results of Observations
We identified packages that were available for each of the three versions of OCaml we wanted
to base our research on (see Table 1) highlighting stages of the gradual change. The number
of commonly available packages is 353. We have therefore used our observation versions
of the compilers to install these 353 packages as we were interested in seeing the changes
developer made since the introduction of immutable strings. Although we installed the same
packages for each compiler version, or more precisely the versions of the same packages that
corresponded to each compiler version, the number of files that were compiled successfully
varied depending of the version. Using the default compilers (4.01.0, 4.02.3, 4.07.0), some
compilations failed. This was in particular the case for 4.02.3 which could be explained
by the fact that 4.02 family saw a number of minor versions making packages maintenance
less effective. A package failing to compile meant that others could not be compiled due to
missing dependency. A small number of compilations which compiled successfully with the
default compiler failed or stalled with our instrumented compilers (4.01.0+obs, 4.02.3+obs,
4.07.0+obs). This was due to the instrumentation we designed with a compiler module to
iterate over the OCaml AST which would sometimes reach the stack limit. As Table 2 shows,
less files compiled successfully with version 4.02.3.
Table 2 Number of files compiled per version.
Version Number of packages installed successfully Number of files compiled successfully
4.01.0 212
4.01.0+obs 201 7211
4.02.3 46
4.02.3+obs 38 2253
4.07.0 224
4.07.0+obs 221 10032
5 https://opam.ocaml.org/
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Use of unsafe string compiler option
We tracked the use of compiler options. This is only applicable to versions of the compiler
released after the change. The gradual transition meant that there was limited incentive for
the developers to use the safe compilation option in 4.02.3 version while 4.07.0 version does.
Table 3 shows that such change of behaviour by the compiler were followed by an uptake of
safer compiler options.
Table 3 Use of unsafe compiler option.
Version Package use of unsafe option File compiled with unsafe option
4.01.0+obs NA / 201 NA / 7211
4.02.3+obs 30 / 38 2100 / 2253
4.07.0+obs 0 / 221 0 / 10032
Expressions of type string and bytes
The observation compilers also counted the number of expressions of type string and bytes
as well as the overall number of expressions in the files that compiled successfully. This
information gives an estimate of the use of these types of expression although it did not
include functions with these types as either argument or output. Table 4 shows a slight
decrease of the number of bytes expressions in proportion to string expressions.
Table 4 Expressions of type string/bytes.
Version string expressions bytes expressions Ratio Total number of expressions
4.01.0+obs 732390 NA NA 7332863
4.02.3+obs 205165 3335 0.0162 2197761
4.07.0+obs 864876 13466 0.0155 9989802
Calls to unsafe String functions
The observation compilers record the usage of unsafe functions from the String module of
the standard library. This recording is not transitive, so if a call is made to a function which
is an alias to a unsafe String function, this will not be identified. Table 5 shows a decrease in
the number of calls to unsafe String functions, although for 4.02.3 version the decrease could
also be due to the set of packages that compiled rather than being due to the introduction of
the change.
Table 5 Call to unsafe String functions.
Version Packages with call to unsafe functions Files with call to unsafe functions
4.01.0+obs 43 / 201 153 / 7211 (2.12%)
4.02.3+obs 5 / 38 16 / 2253 (0.71%)
4.07.0+obs 2 / 221 4 / 10032 (0.03%)
Note that the few remaining cases of call to unsafe String methods with 4.07.0 version
are the consequence of syntax sugaring. The syntax sugaring notations to get (s.[2]) or set
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(s.[2] <- ’i’) a character are respectively translated into the following calls String.get s
and String.set s 2 ’i’. This is still the case for 4.07.0 version which results in the type
checker issuing a warning when identifying the String.set method and accepting its call
when the argument is of type bytes (see an illustration with the following two snippets of
code). This explains why for 4.07.0 version, the cases of call to String.set are compatible
with the the absence of use of unsafe string compiler option.
# let s = "Monday";;
val s : string = "Monday"
# s.[2] <- ’i’;;
Warning 3: deprecated: Stdlib.String.set
Use Bytes.set instead.
Error: This expression has type string but an expression was expected
of type bytes
# let b = Bytes.of_string "Monday";;
val b : bytes = Bytes.of_string "Monday"
# b.[2] <- ’i’;;
Warning 3: deprecated: Stdlib.String.set
Use Bytes.set instead.
- : unit = ()
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The purpose of our research is to understand how software developers refactor their code
in light of security focused language changes. In this paper we presented our compiler
instrumentation and initial findings into the uptake of a gradual change introduced in the
OCaml language and compiler to make strings immutable. We relied on the OCaml type
system and package management system to create instrumented compilers collecting accurate
information about the uptake. Although the study only looked at three versions of the
compiler, it shows a good uptake by the OCaml package developers.
As this is an initial experiment there are many ways it could be improved and expanded.
We aim to apply the same strategy to more versions of the compiler to get a clearer picture
of the uptake. We also would like to expand the investigation by looking at more diverse
repositories of code, and comparing with similar changes in other programming languages.
We have not investigate in details how individual development proceeded with their
change and would like to do so to categories these strategies. It would be interesting to
combine this code based investigation with the way the change and strategy were perceived
by OCaml developers. This could be the base to tailor such changes to optimise uptake or to
create adequate interventions to drive changes.
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